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INTRODUCTION
F ORFEITURE is a common law rarity and an insurance law ubiq-
uity. Each year, millions, if not billions, of dollars of insurance are
forfeited by policyholders who have not punctiliously complied with
all of the "conditions" included in the fine print in their insurance
policies.' Failure to give prompt notice of an accident, failure to file a
timely proof of loss, or an innocent or minor misrepresentation in an
insurance policy application-to cite only three common examples-
may prompt an insurance company to deny coverage on a policy-
holder's otherwise valid claim. Worse, the courts may approve this
forfeiture of insurance coverage even when the harm suffered by the
insurance company from the policyholder's technical noncompliance
is nil, or at any rate, is far less than the harm suffered by the policy-
holder who is denied much needed insurance coverage.2
The punishment does not fit the crime. Forfeiture is a draconian,3
anachronistic, archaic, and profoundly anti-consumer sanction.
Outside insurance law, "hornbook" remedies for breach of contract
no longer include forfeiture, if indeed they ever did.4 Forfeiture is
mentioned in most contexts only in connection with a discussion of
agreed contractual remedies, such as liquidated damages or specific
performance, and even then it is often described as an unenforceable
penalty.' A homeowner can be late in making a mortgage payment
1. See infra part II.
2. Forfeiture may also result if a policyholder neglects to pay premiums. The
argument in this article assumes, however, that premiums have been paid by the poli-
cyholder and accepted by the insurance company.
3. Draco was a 7th Century B.C. Athenian politician and law codifier. Concise
Columbia Encyclopedia 232 (2d ed. 1989); Black's Law Dictionary 493 (6th ed. 1990).
Draco's code prescribed the death penalty for even trivial offenses and the term "dra-
conian" is synonymous with harsh penalties. Concise Columbia Encyclopedia 232 (2d
ed. 1989).
4. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 12.1(1) (2d ed. 1993) (describing the main
remedies available for breach of contract as damages, restitution, and specific per-
formance); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.2 (1st ed. 1982) (same); see Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 345 (1981) (same); infra part III.C.
It can be argued that insurance should not be analyzed in the context of contract
law. Much of the discussion in this article involves contract law principles and reme-
dies only because most commentators and courts have viewed the insurance policy as
a contract and the insurance relationship as a contractual relationship. The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, is one court that has recognized that "[i]nsurance is differ-
ent." E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, No. 35, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 179,
at *36 (Del. May 2, 1996). The case involved employment law, and was not an insur-
ance coverage dispute.
5. See infra part III.C. For example, it may be provided in a contract that a de-
posit of money will be forfeited in the event of a breach by the depositor. Dobbs,
supra note 4, § 12.9(4). For a discussion of forfeiture as an unenforceable penalty, see
William H. Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 117, 122 (1915).
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but still keep his home. 6 At common law, even a dog got one bite.7
There is no free bite, however, no opportunity to "kiss and make up,"
for the insurance policyholder. When an insurance company can show
the policyholder's noncompliance with any condition in the insurance
policy, the insurance claim may be denied, an action the courts fre-
quently affirm.8
Forfeiture of insurance is a massive and disproportionate penalty in
relation to the policyholder's relatively harmless noncompliance with
a condition in the insurance policy. A policyholder who purchases
standard form liability insurance acquires five distinct services: (1)
loss prevention and safety engineering services;9 (2) investigation of
claims;10 (3) legal defense;" (4) loss mitigation (the policyholder's ex-
penses incurred to mitigate damages that would accrue if no remedial
6. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 404 (1992) (giving the homeowner the right to
cure a default in mortgage payment).
7. The "one-bite" rule stated that the owner of a dog had to have reason to know
of his animal's vicious tendency, such as a previous bite, before he or she could be
held liable for injury caused by the dog. Gallick v. Barto, 828 F. Supp. 1168, 1174
(M.D. Pa. 1993). At common law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that a dog owner
either knew or was negligent not to know that his dog had a propensity to ijure
people. Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917, 918 (ilL 1988). Although an owner has a
duty to prevent animals from injuring others, the owner must have had notice of an
otherwise tame animal's ill quality in order to hold him liable. Robert J. Kaczorowski,
The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 Ohio St. LJ.
1127, 1174 n.308 (1990) (citing Mason v. Keeling, 88 Eng. Rep. 1359, 1361 (K.B.
1700)).
Jurisdictions have modified the "one-bite" rule by statute. See, eg., Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 3, §§ 459-502(a) (1995) (mandating that any dog "which bites or attacks a human
being" shall be confined for a minimum of ten days at the owner's expense); Gallick,
828 F. Supp. at 1174 (discussing a statute that expands the owner's liability to cases
where the owner lacks knowledge of the animal's vicious tendencies).
8. See infra part II.
9. See Pratt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 667, 668 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that an insurance company that conducted active loss-prevention program at the
workplace could be sued in negligence for failure to exercise due care in performing
safety inspections).
10. See Carter v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 473 F.2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1973);
Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1970); Roberts v.
American Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F. Supp. 827, 832 (M.D. Tenn. 1950), aff'd, 186 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1951); Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insur-
ance Coverage Disputes § 10.04[a] (8th ed. 1995) ("It is well-settled that [a policy-
holder] is entitled to a reasonable investigation as part of its defense.").
An insurance company that does not make such an investigation is subject to liabil-
ity for bad faith. See Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that an insurance company's failure to investigate adequately the policy-
holder's claim before refusing to defend constituted bad faith, entitling the policy-
holder to punitive damages); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526
(Wash. 1990) (stating that an insurance company's failure to make a reasonable inves-
tigation constitutes bad faith because any resulting denial of a claim would be based
on suspicion and conjecture).
11. The standard form comprehensive general liability insurance policy ("CGL")
provides that the insurance company has the "right and duty to defend" any "suit"
seeking damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage." 1 Susan J. Miller
& Philip Lefebvre, Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated 409 (4th ed. 1995).
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action were taken);12 and (5) indemnity.13 An unexpected forfeiture
of the entire policy, as may happen when the policyholder has made
an innocent misrepresentation in an application, 14 may result in the
loss of all of these services that are included with the insurance policy
coverage. In sum, as one court accurately observed, "automatic for-
feiture of [insurance] coverage due to a technical breach in an adhe-
sion policy is inconsistent with any notion of fairness.' 15
It is curious, and unfortunate, that insurance should be the one area
of law, outside the criminal and quasi-criminal context,' 6 in which for-
feiture is alive and thriving. It is frequently noted that insurance poli-
cies are different from most contracts,' 7 primarily because insurance
undeniably has an important social significance. Williston observes
that an insurance policy differs from ordinary, negotiated contracts by
the
increasing tendency of the public to look upon the insurance policy
not as a contract but as a special form of chattel. The typical appli-
cant buys "protection" much as he buys groceries. The protection is
intangible, to be sure, but he is reassured by the words of the agent
and by the fact that agent and company are regulated by the state
and licensed to do business there.... [I]nsurance must still be con-
sidered a contract between insurer and insured, but it is a very spe-
cial type of contract ....
12. See Slay Warehousing Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (8th Cir.
1973) (finding that the CGL covers expenses incurred by a policyholder in taking
steps, following collapse of warehouse wall, to prevent chemicals stored in policy-
holder's warehouse from damage due to exposure); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
799 P.2d 1253, 1280 (Cal. 1990) (holding that costs that are mitigative in character are
"damages"); Metex v. Federal Ins. Co., 675 A.2d 220, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996); Aronson Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 14 Pa. D. &
C.3d 1, 6 (1977); see also Leebov v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 165 A.2d 82,
84 (Pa. 1960) (holding that coverage included the costs of arresting a landslide where
"disastrous consequences might have befallen the adjoining and nearby properties");
Defendants-In-Intervention's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 12-13, Federal Ins. Co. v. Emery
Mining Corp., No. 86C-0696-G (D. Utah Apr. 29, 1988) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (arguing that "most, if not all, jurisdictions strongly favors [sic] a finding
of insurance coverage of mitigation expenses incurred to prevent potential or in-
creased property damage").
13. See Eugene R. Anderson et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for Corporate
Counsel, 49 Bus. Law. 259, 282 (1993) [hereinafter Liability Insurance]; see also Eu-
gene R. Anderson et al., What Every Corporate Lawyer Should Know About Insur-
ance Coverage, Corp. Analyst, Feb. 1996, at 2-3.
14. See infra part II.D.
15. Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 84-4025, slip. op. at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6,
1986).
16. For a discussion of the civil forfeiture debate, see Barbara A. Mack, Double
Jeopardy-Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punishment: Who Determines What Punish-
ment Fits the Crime, 19 Seattle U.L. Rev. 217 (1996).
17. See Robert E. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law ch. 6 (1971).
18. 7 Williston on Contracts § 900, at 34, 36 (1963) (footnote omitted). Professor
(now Judge) Keeton has counseled that "because of the public interests at stake,
courts should decline to legitimate the development of labyrinthian policy provisions
[Vol. 65
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Ironically, insurance companies agree. One text used to train insur-
ance company personnel emphasizes:
Notwithstanding the often stated opinion that the insurance con-
tract is a contract affected with a public interest, insurers often view
their policies as simple contractual obligations between parties.
While an insurance policy does represent a contractual commit-
ment, the attitudes of the general public, the legislatures, and the
courts make clear that the insurance agreement is viewed as having
broader ramifications than a mere contract. The public has a defi-
nite interest in the reliability of the insurance product. Insurance
involves an obligation that affects the public interest as well as the
policyholder and therefore is necessarily subject to certain
restrictions.!9
Insurance companies understand that insurance protects against losses
individual policyholders would not be able to withstand otherwise.20
Moreover, beyond the welfare of the individual policyholder, insur-
ance is affected with a public interest.2' Insurance protects not only
policyholders, but also injured parties, neighbors, the community,
creditors, and employees. 2- Dean Roscoe Pound wrote:
the reconciliation of which requires inordinately complex analysis and occasions
wasteful litigation." Keeton, supra note 17, at 172.
Much of the discussion in this article involves contract law principles and remedies
only because many commentators and courts view the insurance policy as a contract.
Insurance is not a contract but is a product. In fact, the President of the Insurance
Services Office ("ISO"), Inc., Fred R. Marcon, referred to ISO's insurance policy
forms as products, stating "[o]ne look at ISO's Products Catalog will convince you
that we're providing this industry with an ever-widening array of products and serv-
ices." Fred R. Marcon, President's Remarks at the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of
Insurance Services Office 21 (Jan. 14, 1992); see Joanne Wesolowski Vuelfing, Bal-
anced Research Vital to Product Development, Best's Rev., June 1996, at 78; Joseph H.
Golant, Patenting Coverages, Best's Rev., Apr. 1993, at 24 ("The insurance and fi-
nance industries issue a variety of products, with the possibilities limited only by the
imagination.").
In 1981, Carole J. Banfield of ISO stated that "[b]ecause of its unique position in
the property/liability insurance industry, ISO is careful to observe the restrictions and
limitations that govern its products and services." Carole J. Banfield, The Role of
Insurance Service Associations in the Property/Casualty Business, Address at Insur-
ance Services Office 1981 Annual Conference, in The Interpreter, Dec. 1981, at 31.
For an extensive discussion of insurance industry advertising that refers to insur-
ance as "products," see Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 Tex. L Rev. 1395 (1994).
19. James J. Lorimer et al., The Legal Environment of Insurance 38 (3d ed. 1987).
20. Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transac-
tions: Reining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute,
26 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1, 10-11 (1992).
21. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931);
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 413 (1914).
22. Charles A. McAlear, The Emperor's Old Clothes, Best's Rev., Feb. 1989, at 22-
23. The insurance industry has characterized itself as the "banker of the tort system."
Brief of the American Insurance Association, the National Association of Independ-
ent Insurers, Farmers Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange, the State Farm
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
[W]e have taken the law of insurance practically out of the category
of contract, and we have established that the duties of public service
companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth century sought to
make them, but are instead relational; they do not flow from agree-
ments which the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow
from the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent rela-
tion to the public.23
The "public interest" nature of insurance is confirmed by the myriad
of state laws governing insurance. For example, states regulate auto-
mobile insurance coverage24 and workers' compensation insurance
25coverage. Moreover, a text that is used to train those preparing to
become Certified Property and Casualty Underwriters notes that stat-
utes concerning the conduct of insurance companies "have been en-
acted by state legislatures in order to control the activities of the
insurance companies and their relationships with policyholders. 26
The purpose of insurance is to insure.27 When insurance coverage is
forfeited, policyholders will not receive the primary benefit that they
intended to purchase, peace of mind.28 Despite the widespread con-
Insurance Companies, and Truck Insurance Exchange as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant at 2-3 n.1, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1996) (No. 84-1601).
23. Bradford J. Harris, Comment, Extracontractual Insurance Damages: Penn-
sylvania Insureds Demand a "Piece of the Rock," 85 Dick. L. Rev. 321, 322 (1981)
(quoting Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 29 (1929)).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 310-321 (McKinney 1995) (setting forth the
requirements for auto insurance in New York state).
25. See 3 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation for Occupational Injuries and
Death § 92.11 (1995).
26. James J. Markham et al., The Claims Environment 347 (1993).
27. See Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 154 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1994); Queen
City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1024, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992),
affd in part, remanded in part, 882 P.2d 703 (Wash. 1994); 13 John Alan Appleman &
Jean Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7403 (1976).
Even insurance companies agree. One insurance company lawyer has said "[a]n
insurance contract is, of course, meant to 'insure.' This is 'the first and great com-
mandment."' Alfred E. Reichenberger, The General Liability Insurance Policies-
Analysis of 1973 Revisions, in General Liability Insurance-1973 Revisions 5, 5-6
(Fred L. Bardenwerter & Donald J. Hirsch eds., Def. Res. Inst. 1974).
28. See Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
an insurance contract's value is the peace of mind it gives the insured); Armada de la
Republica v. Yorkington, L.P., C.A. No. 92-0285 (RCL), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1317,
at *50 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1995) ("The peace of mind that comes with the assurance that
one's insurance company will assume responsibility for defending lawsuits arising
under one's policy can be an integral component of a liability insurance contract.");
Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 916 (S.D. Ind. 1994) ("People
buy insurance for peace of mind .... ."); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177-
78 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (holding that insurance company had a duty to consider a
settlement offer that was within the range of the policyholder's contract); McCorkle v.
Great Ad. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) (finding that the insurance was
purchased to protect against accidental loss and mental stress); Christian v. American
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1977) (finding that insurance company
had duty to act in good faith in handling the policyholder's claim); D'Ambrosio v.
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 972 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]nsurance is purchased to provide peace of mind.")
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sensus about this fact, forfeiture persists as a remedy for insurance
companies against policyholders for minor insurance policy infrac-
tions. This Article argues that forfeiture is a needlessly harsh and in-
equitable remedy for relatively innocuous noncompliance with
conditions in insurance contracts. This Article considers the problems
that arise from a policyholder's failure to comply fully with the condi-
tions in the policy,2 9 the assertions by insurance companies in disputes
with their reinsurers that forfeiture is an inequitable remedy, 30 and the
remedies, other than forfeiture, that are available to insurance compa-
nies and courts in breach of contract cases. 31 Part I discusses the typi-
cal conditions contained in an insurance policy. Part 1I considers a
variety of judicial decisions where the courts have imposed forfeiture
on policyholders for relatively harmless and technical violations of
their insurance policies. Part III, drawing upon general principles of
contract law and the arguments of insurance companies, argues that
forfeiture is an unnecessary and inequitably harsh remedy. Part IV
argues that courts, as an alternative remedy to forfeiture, should
award an insurance company the actual damages it suffered from the
policyholder's breach. This Article concludes that, because insurance
companies suffer relatively minor harm from a policyholder's breach
of a policy condition, forfeiture is an improper remedy.
I. THE TYPICAL CONDITIONS FOUND IN INSURANCE POLICIES
This part discusses the conditions and requirements that are typi-
cally included in insurance policies. Specifically, this part focuses on
four issues: (1) the notice of occurrence or claim condition; (2) the
proof of loss condition; (3) the examination under oath condition; and
(4) misrepresentations in insurance applications.
A. Conditions Generally
An insurance policy may contain conditions.32 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts defines a condition as "an event, not certain to
This loss of peace of mind is particularly burdensome when the product purchased
was life and health insurance. Long delays in payment of health insurance claims can
cause severe hardship for purchasers of health insurance. See Esther B. Fein & Elisa-
beth Rosenthal, Delays by H.M.O. Leaving Patients Haunted by Bills, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1996, at Al.
29. See infra part II.
30. See infra part III.B.
31. See infra part IV.
32. See infra part II.B. Insurance policy provisions are regulated by state insur-
ance departments and some are mandated by statute. See e.g., 12 Appleman & Ap-
pleman, supra note 27, § 7043 (describing the controlling effect of statutes on
particular insurance provisions and requirements). Unfortunately, state insurance de-
partments are no longer consumer protection agencies. See Riordan v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that the response of the
New York Superintendent of Insurance to policyholder's complaint was to advise the
policyholder to "retain an attorney and sue."); see also Walter L Updegrave, Stacking
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occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under a contract becomes due."33 The Restatement's def-
inition describes what is traditionally referred to as a "condition pre-
cedent," 3 which is an event that must occur before performance is
due. There are also "conditions subsequent," by which a duty that has
already arisen may be discharged by the occurrence of a specified
event.35 A better, and simpler, definition includes both notions: "[A]
condition is an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless
the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a prom-
ise in the agreement arises ... or which discharges a duty of perform-
ance that has already arisen .... "36
Arguments to defeat insurance coverage based upon the policy-
holder's noncompliance with policy conditions are as old as insur-
ance. 37 These arguments are typified by the following statement in
1894 by the United States Supreme Court:
Contracts of insurance are contracts of indemnity upon the terms
and conditions specified in the policy or policies, embodying the
agreement of the parties. For a comparatively small consideration
the insurer undertakes to guarantee the insured against loss or dam-
age, upon the terms and conditions agreed upon, and upon no
other, and when called upon to pay, in case of loss, the insurer,
therefore, may justly insist upon the fulfillment of these terms....
The compliance of the assured with the terms of the contract is a
condition precedent to the right of recovery.... It is immaterial to
consider the reasons for the conditions or provisions on which the
the Deck, Money, Aug. 1996, at 50 (finding that the insurance industry writes its own
laws because insurance regulators are closely tied to the industry). State insurance
departments are almost exclusively concerned with insurance company solvency. See
In re Plan of Restructuring of INA Financial Corp., No. MS95-10-056 (Pa. Ins. Comm.
Feb. 7, 1996), reprinted in 10 Mealey's Litigation Reports: Insurance, at A-1 (Feb. 14,
1996).
33. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1981); see 3A Corbin on Contracts
§ 627 (West 1960); Farnsworth, supra note 4, § 8.2 (1982).
34. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-2 (3d ed.
1987); Farnsworth, supra note 4, § 8.2 (1982).
35. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, § 11-7.
36. Id. § 11-2.
37. At early common law, policies of insurance and regular contracts were treated
similarly by the courts. Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party
Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the
Remedies by Statute, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1, 5 (1992). In fact, before 1786, warranties
in insurance policies were treated the same as warranties in general. Id. at 5 n.19. A
warranty in an insurance policy was a policyholder's statement promising "the exist-
ence of certain facts,.., the literal truth of which is essential to the validity of the
contract." 7 George J. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 35.2 (Ronald A. Ander-
son ed., 2d ed. 1985). Warranties were required to be accurate, but an immaterial
breach, which was not connected to the loss, would not work a forfeiture. Henderson,
supra, at 5 n.19. Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of Kings' Bench, changed
this rule. In De Hahn v. Hartley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1786), the court held that
even an immaterial breach of warranty would permit an insurance company to avoid
the insurance policy. See Robert E. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 5.6 (1971).
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contract is made to terminate, or any other provision of the policy
which has been accepted and agreed upon. It is enough that the
parties have made certain terms, conditions on which their contract
shall continue or terminate. The courts may not make a contract for
the parties.38
Although strict forfeiture rules in insurance cases have been mitigated
occasionally since 1894,39 they have not been eliminated.
B. Common Insurance Policy Conditions
Most liability and property insurance policies contain a section ti-
tled "Conditions." A number of the provisions in the "Conditions"
section impose duties upon the policyholder that arise in the event of
a loss. Three of these post-loss conditions are: (1) notice conditions
requiring the policyholder to give notice "as soon as practicable" of an
occurrence or a claim or suit;41 (2) conditions requiring policyholders
38. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 462 (1894). The Court's
emphasis on the "comparatively small consideration" paid by the policyholder is tell-
ing. The discussion antedates wide acceptance of insurance as an important compo-
nent of the tort recovery system and therefore gives little recognition to the fact that
premiums, in gross, normally exceed claims paid. Moreover, most modem large com-
panies incur enormous costs for insurance premiums, exceeding over time their aggre-
gate recovery upon claims.
39. Within seven years of its decision in Coos County, the Supreme Court, like
many other courts, began to soften its view about policy "conditions," recognizing
that the policyholder needed some protection from the insurance company's skills at
drafting policy language:
A literal interpretation of the contracts of insurance might sustain a contrary
view, but the law does not require such an interpretation. In so holding the
court does not make for the parties a contract which they did not make for
themselves. It only interprets the contract so as to do no violence to the
words used and yet to meet the ends of justice.
Liverpool London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 138 (1901) (holding
that a requirement that documents be stored in a "fireproof safe" was not violated by
policyholder's decision to remove documents from the safe during a fire and appar-
ently misplacing an inventory in the process).
40. See Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 280.
41. For example, the standard commercial general liability ("CGL") form promul-
gated by the Insurance Services Office, Inc., provides:
2. Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Offense, Claim or Suit.
a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an
"occurrence" or offense which may result in a claim....
b. If a claim is made or "suit" is brought against any insured, you must:
(1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim or "suit" and the
date received; and
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable. You must see to it that we re-
ceive written notice of the claim or "suit" as soon as practicable.
c. You and any other involved insured must:
(1) Immediately send us copies of any demands, notices, summonses
or legal papers received in connection with the claim or "suit."
Susan J. Miller & Philip Lefebvre, Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated
415-16 (4th ed. 1995). The standard homeowners' form provides that in case of a loss
to covered property the policyholder must:
a. Give prompt notice to us or our agent;
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with property insurance coverage to send to the insurance company,
within sixty days after the insurance company's request, a signed,
sworn, proof of loss;4" and (3) conditions that a property insurance
policyholder submit to an examination under oath. 3
1. Notice of Claim
Notice of occurrence or claim clauses are intended to enable insur-
ance companies to investigate occurrences," claims, and suits while
the facts of a claim are still readily available, and enable the insurance
company to make an informed decision as to whether or not insurance
coverage exists.45 In addition, prompt notice, it has been contended,
"allow[s] the insurance company to make an investigation of the acci-
dent in order to prepare a defense .... to afford the insurance com-
b. Notify the police in case of loss by theft;
d. Protect the property from further damage...
e. Prepare an inventory of damaged personal property showing the quan-
tity, description, actual cash value and amount of loss.
Id. at 210.
42. Id. at 456 (describing homeowners' insurance and standard commercial all-risk
property insurance).
A "proof of loss" includes a formal statement of the claim and other information.
A document or form may be furnished to the policyholder for this purpose, but, nor-
mally, the proof may be made in any manner as long as it contains adequate informa-
tion. 2 Stephen A. Cozen, Insuring Real Property § 21.02, at 21-5 (1996).
43. 1 Miller & Lefebvre, supra note 41, at 210, 456.1 (describing homeowners'
insurance and standard commercial all-risk property insurance).
Some insurance policies contain conditions which explicitly state that failure to
comply with the condition will cause the policy to be void. For example, one Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company policy provided:
Concealment, Fraud
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the in-
sured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circum-
stance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the
insured therein or in the case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured
relating thereto.
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Sup-
port of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 50, Biddle Sawyer Corp.
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. MON-L-5219-91 (NJ. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1995) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review) (arguing that because policyholder did not comply
with the condition, coverage for policyholder's claim was precluded).
44. See Arthur Paul Berg, "Occurrence". An Elusive Description, in "Occurrence"
and Other Coverage Issues 2 (Donald J. Hirsch & Eva M. Soeka eds., Def. Res. Inst.
1982).
45. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Maren Eng'g Corp., 403 N.E.2d 508,
511 (111. App. Ct. 1980); 8 Appleman & Appleman, supra note 27, § 4731 (stating that
the purpose of the provision requiring prompt notice is to give the insurance company
an opportunity to make a timely and adequate investigation).
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pany the opportunity to control the litigation,"6 and to determine
whether or not the claim is fraudulent. 7
2. Proof of Loss
In addition to requiring the policyholder to send notice of a claim to
the insurance company, property insurance policies also require the
policyholder to submit a sworn proof of loss as specified in the insur-
ance policy or at the insurance company's request.8 The proof of loss
is normally a single-page form on which the policyholder makes the
request for payment and states the amount sought with a sworn, nota-
rized signature at the bottom.4 9 Insurance companies require a proof
of loss to enable them to determine if the claim comes within the
terms of the policy, to make an investigation, and to prevent fraud.50
3. Examination Under Oath
Property insurance policies also contain a provision that requires a
policyholder to submit to an examination under oath.5 1 This examina-
tion enables the insurance company to gather all available knowledge
and information relating to the loss and to evaluate its rights and obli-
gations to protect itself against false claims.5 Insurance companies
contend that the policyholder's noncompliance with this provision de-
prives the insurance company of a valuable right for which it
contracted.53
46. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 313 P.2d 347, 352
(Wash. 1957); see Ostrager & Newman, supra note 10, § 4.02[a], at 91-92.
47. Duggan v. Travelers Indem. Co., 383 F.2d 871, 873-74 (1st Cir. 1967); Young v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1941); General Fmo. Co. v. Pennsylvania
Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 35 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. 1944).
48. See supra note 42.
49. 1 Miller & Lefebvre, supra note 41, at 456.1. In practice, the policyholder
requests payment from the insurance company, the agent, the broker, or the insur-
ance adjuster before the proof of loss is submitted. The form is merely a sworn ver-
sion of the request. If insurance is denied and the policyholder sues, the policyholder
must make a sworn statement or give sworn testimony before the court that the claim
is legitimate and insurance proceeds are due. Thus, the proof of loss serves little
purpose except as a "hoop" through which the policyholder must jump (or stumble
over) to obtain the insurance benefits for which premiums have already been paid and
accepted. A misstatement in the sworn proof of loss may subject the policyholder to
forfeitures for false swearing and criminal prosecution for perjury.
50. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1974); see Allan
D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 3.03 (2d ed. 1988).
51. See supra note 43.
52. See Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 97 (1884).
53. 5A Appleman & Appleman, supra note 27, § 3549, at 549-50; see American
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Riggins, 604 So. 2d 535, 535-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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4. Representations in Applications
A policyholder may lose insurance coverage when a material mis-
statement appears in the application.5 The general rules are clear
and widely accepted:
If a material misrepresentation is made concerning the matter at
risk, it may constitute such a breach as will relieve the insurer of
liability .... A misrepresentation may invalidate the policy regard-
less of whether the concealment was intentional or unintentional
.... Under the common law, an insurer has no duty to investigate
and confirm material representations. The insurer can therefore
cancel the policy after a claim has been made.55
Forfeiture may be imposed even though the misstatement was made
innocently.56
II. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH INSURANCE CONDITIONS MAY
RESULT IN FOREFE1TURE OF COVERAGE
This part discusses a variety of decisions in which courts have im-
posed forfeiture of coverage on policyholders who have not complied
with policy conditions. This part focuses on court decisions where
courts have imposed forfeiture of coverage because the policyholder:
(1) failed to notify the insurance company of its claim; (2) failed to file
a proof of loss; (3) failed to submit to an examination under oath; or
(4) made misrepresentations in an insurance application.
A. Notice of Claim
Policyholders and insurance brokers often wait until the extent of a
loss or liability is clearer before they notify their insurance companies.
Any delay, however, is unwise. In many states, a delay in giving no-
tice will result in automatic forfeiture of insurance coverage.57 One
court described the rationale and operation of the rule requiring for-
feiture for late notice as follows:
The purpose of a notice requirement. . . is to enable the insurer to
make a timely and thorough investigation of the injury claim ....
Such provisions are not considered technical requirements, but
rather are valid prerequisites to coverage .... Therefore, when the
insured fails to comply with a prompt notice requirement, the in-
54. See infra part II.D.
55. 6B Appleman & Appleman, supra note 27, § 4252, at 9-15 (footnotes omitted).
56. A common statement is that "[i]nnocent material misrepresentations will have
the same affect [sic] as fraud in rendering the policy voidable." Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Knutsen, 324 A.2d 223, 230 (Vt. 1974).
57. See infra Appendix (noting that Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Illinois, Louisiana, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia require auto-
matic forfeiture for noncompliance with notice conditions). Other states, such as Ar-
kansas, Idaho, and Mississippi impose forfeiture if the condition is found to be a
"condition precedent." Id.
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surer may deny liability, regardless of whether it has been
prejudiced by the delay.5U
Delays of as little as ten days, 9 thirteen days, twenty-two days,6'
forty days,62 forty-six days,63 and fifty-three days6' have resulted in
forfeiture of insurance coverage.
For example, under New York law, compliance with the notice pro-
visions in an insurance policy is a condition precedent to all of the
insurance company's duties under the policy, including the duty to de-
fend. If the policyholder fails to give adequate, timely notice, the
insurance company need not show prejudice; there is simply no insur-
ance coverage.6 Courts have found that relatively short, unexcused
periods of delay in giving notice were "unreasonable as a matter of
law."6
7
An examination of the fact patterns of these cases reveals the enor-
mous inequity of these holdings. For example, in Deso v. London &
Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America,' the court held that written
notice to the insurance company five months after an accident re-
sulted in forfeiture of insurance coverage. 69 In that case, the policy-
holder was a landlord whose tenant fell on the landlord's steps. At
58. INA Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 379 N.E.2d 34, 36-37 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978)
(citations omitted).
59. Haas Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 123 N.E. 755, 755 (N.Y. 1919).
60. Gullo v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 235 N.Y.S. 584,588 (App. Div. 1929).
61. Rooney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 67 N.E. 882, 883 (Mass. 1903); Rushing v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450, 451 (N.Y. 1929).
62. Brackman v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 208 N.E.2d 225, 225 (Mass. 1965).
63. Edwards v. Ranger Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
64. Power Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423 (App. Div.
1986).
65. Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76, 78 (N.Y.
1972) (holding that absent a valid excuse, failure to satisfy the notice requirement of
the policy vitiates insurance coverage); Town of Smithtown v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 594 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1993); see White v. City of New York, 598
N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (N.Y. 1993). The hardships created by the failure of an insurance
company to defend its policyholder because of allegedly late notice are detailed in
Rhonda D. Orin, The Wrong War, the Wrong 7un4 the Wrong Enemy: Insurers' Ale-
gations of Late Notice Are Untimely when Underlying Actions Are Pending, 31 Tort &
Ins. LJ. 711 (1996).
66. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 293 N.E.2d at 78.
67. Deso v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 143 N.E.2d 889, 891 (N.Y.
1957); Winstead v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 608 N.Y.S.2d 487,489 (App. Div.
1994); Pandora Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 590 N.Y.S.2d 471, 471
(App. Div. 1992); Schiebel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.Y.S2d 801, 801 (App.
Div. 1990); Republic N.Y. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 509 N.Y.S.2d 339,
339-40 (App. Div. 1986); Power Auth., 502 N.Y.S.2d at 423; Gold Fields Am. Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 19879/89, slip op. at 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 1996);
see American Home Assurance Co. v. Republic Ins. Co. 984 F2d 76,78-79 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993) (applying New York law); American Motorists Ins.
Co. v. General Host Corp., 919 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (D. Kan. 1996) (applying New
York law).
68. 143 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 1957).
69. Id. at 891.
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the time of the accident, the tenant told the policyholder, "It's all
right."7" Three and one-half months after the fall, the tenant's doctor
told him that his sore back was the result of the fall, and the tenant
reported the diagnosis to the policyholder.7' The policyholder, who
was not fluent in English and who was unfamiliar with insurance, testi-
fied that he sent the policy to the insurance company within a month
and a half of learning about the connection between the accident and
the injury.7 2 Five months and one week after the accident, and less
than two months after the policyholder learned of the facts, the policy-
holder notified the insurance company of the accident on a form sup-
plied by the insurance company. The insurance company investigated
the premises, interviewed the policyholder, took photographs, and ob-
tained a physical examination of the injured tenant. After the physi-
cal examination, the insurance company disclaimed insurance
coverage based on the failure to comply strictly with the notice provi-
sion. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the written notice,
given five months after the accident and two months after the policy-
holder acquired knowledge, was untimely as a matter of law, and that
the policyholder had forfeited his insurance.73
More recently, in Steelcase, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance
Co.,74 a policyholder waited two years before notifying the insurance
company about a spill of hazardous material.75 The policyholder
waited76 because it believed the cleanup expenses would be minimal.77
When the problem grew, the policyholder and the broker gave no-
70. Idt at 890.
71. See id
72. Id at 892 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
73. Idt at 891. New York's common law is more favorable to insurance companies
than to policyholders. James A. McGuire & Kristin Dodge McMahon, Issues for Ex-
cess Insurer Counsel in Bad Faith and Excess Liability Cases, 62 Def. Couns. J. 337,
338-39 (1995); James A. McGuire & Kristin Dodge McMahon, Bad Faith, Excess Lia-
bility and Extracontractual Damages: Counsel for the Excess Carrier Looks at the Is-
sues, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 49, 52 (1994). New York law is the law of choice for
insurance companies as evidenced by offshore insurance policies that regularly con-
tain a New York choice of law provision. Eugene R. Anderson & Paul Liben, The
Perfect Insurance or the Perfect Crime, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Jan. 1995, at 51.
Curiously, New York law is more policyholder friendly when the policyholder is an
insurance company. In the reinsurance context, the New York Court of Appeals re-
quires the reinsurer who disclaims coverage for an insurance company to prove preju-
dice. Uniguard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. 1992).
In a recent decision, a New York court ruled that an excess insurance company, like a
reinsurance company, must plead and show prejudice from the late notice. American
Home Assurance Co. v. International Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (App. Div.
1996).
74. No. G87-553 CA1, 1989 WL 253892 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 1989), affd, 907 F.2d
151 (6th Cir. 1990).
75. See id at *1-2.
76. The policyholder advised its broker of the loss, but not the insurance company
directly.
77. 1989 WL 253892, at *1.
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tice.78 The insurance company denied coverage based solely upon late
notice.79 The policyholder sued the insurance company and lost. The
court held that insurance coverage was forfeited by reason of late no-
tice.80 The policyholder's uninsured loss totaled almost $1 million8"
Insurance companies frequently contend that forfeiture is necessary
to permit insurance companies to establish adequate reserves to cover
potential liability and to calculate future premiums, In effect they
argue that "the actuaries made us do it."'  The insurance company in
Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.8 argued that the policyholder's
failure to provide the insurance company with notice of an occurrence
for six and one-half months required forfeiture of coverage, and that
prejudice from the delay need not be proved.1a As support for its
arguments, the insurance company referred to its calculations of pre-
miums. It maintained that strict compliance by the policyholder with
notice clauses was essential for the insurance company to price its in-
surance according to the risk.8 6 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
disagreed:
The insurance carrier has argued that [notice] clauses are essential
from an actuarial standpoint in order to price the insurance accord-
ing to the risk. Whereas this argument is valid with reference to
imposing on the insurer risks which are unreasonable and unfore-
seeable, such is not the case with this clause in this policy. Where
there has been no prejudice to the insurer from the delay in notice,
there has been no increase in the risk. On the contrary, in the ab-
sence of prejudice a strict forfeiture clause simply provides the in-
surance company with a windfall.87
The court realized that when strict application of a notice condition in
the absence of prejudice results in forfeiture, the insurance company
receives a windfall.as Although this windfall might be returned to
78. Id. at *2.
79. See id- at *2-3.
80. Id. at *12.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Ostrager & Newman, supra note 10, § 4.02[a].
83. Although insurance companies contend that forfeiture is necessary because
they find it difficult to forecast future liability, insurance companies know that courts
are concerned with the inadequacy of information in insurance policies. As one com-
mentator has stated:
That [the inequality of information] being understood, the terms of mass-
marketed insurance are prepared with sensitivity to what has been called the
"juridical risk." To that extent the insurance industry itself discounts the
value of the stock of underwriting information that is available to it: the
claims-adjustment function overrides that of risk-classification.
W.F. Young, Is Insurance a Niche Business? Reflections on Information as an Insur-
ance Product, 1 Conn. Ins. L. 1, 15 (1995) (footnote omitted).
84. 821 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1991).
85. See id. at 800.
86. See id at 802.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 802-03.
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other policyholders in the form of lower rates, as insurance companies
will argue, it need not be. If the insurance company is having a diffi-
cult year, non-payment of a $5 million claim to a policyholder might
mean the difference between a profit or loss for the year. The premi-
ums of other policyholders may not be lowered at all.
The majority of jurisdictions now require that the insurance com-
pany show that it has been prejudiced by late notice.89 A careful opin-
ion from the Tenth Circuit summarized the various views regarding
forfeiture and late notice:
Our research indicates that there are three different approaches to
this question which is concerned with the degree of prejudice which
results from the failure of the insured to notify the insurer of an
accident. The oldest of these viewpoints takes the position that
prejudice to the insurer is not an important element; that it is imma-
terial. In jurisdictions which hold to this view, the failure to give
timely notice results in violation of a valid covenant of the policy
which in turn results in loss of coverage.
A second view is that an unreasonably late notice raises a pre-
sumption of prejudice to the insurer. The presence of the presump-
tion places the burden of showing lack of prejudice on the insured
party.
A third view of late notice is that no presumption of prejudice
results. It is up to the insurer to demonstrate substantial prejudice
growing out of the late notice before it is relieved of liability under
the policy.90
Other states permit the policyholder to prove the lack of prejudice to
the insurance company.9 '
89. See infra Appendix (noting that Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia
require the insurance company to prove prejudice); Ostrager & Newman, supra note
10, § 4.02[bJ[5].
90. Jennings v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (10th Cir.
1977) (citations omitted).
91. See infra Appendix (noting that Connecticut and Florida follow this ap-
proach); Niesz v. Albright, 217 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. ACC Chem. Co., 538 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Iowa 1995); Henschel v.
Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 178 N.W.2d 409, 419-20 (Iowa 1970).
Other courts have disagreed with this result. As the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. observed:
There are two reasons for imposing the burden on the insurance carrier to
prove prejudice, rather than imposing on the claimant the burden to prove
no prejudice resulted. The first is the obvious one: it is virtually impossible
to prove a negative, so it would be difficult if not impossible for the claimant
to prove the insurance carrier suffered no prejudice. Secondly, the insurance
carrier is in a far superior position to be knowledgeable about the facts
which establish whether prejudice exists.
821 S.W.2d at 803.
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Courts that require the insurance company to show prejudice to
avoid insurance coverage have explained their holdings in terms of
public policy. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in its decision
adopting a prejudice approach:
The insurance contract not being a truly consensual arrangement
and being available only on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and the sub-ject being in essence a matter of forfeiture, we think it appropriate
to hold that [insurance coverage is not forfeited] unless there are
both a breach of the notice provision and a likelihood of apprecia-
ble prejudice. The burden of persuasion is the carrier's.
Similarly, in New England Reinsurance Corp. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held:
The underlying public policy requiring a showing of insurer preju-
dice to avoid coverage liability does not change depending on
whether an unambiguous notice provision is described as a condi-
tion precedent to liability or a coverage covenant .... For an in-
surer to circumvent California's public policy underlying the notice
prejudice rule by the simple expedient of categorizing the notice
clause as a coverage requirement would be a triumph of form over
substance.93
The court concluded that forfeiture was an inequitable solution.'
There has also been opposition to forfeitures among state legisla-
tures, and even among some insurance companies. Some state legisla-
tures have followed the lead of the courts and have enacted statutes
that limit forfeitures. 5 In Maryland, insurance coverage cannot be
forfeited because of late notice unless the insurance company proves
"actual prejudice. '9 6
At least one insurance company has also recognized the unfairness
of forfeiture. The Aetna Technical Claim Manual affords its low-level
claims handlers great discretion in waiving alleged late notice, advis-
ing that "[i]f there is six months to a year delay, use your discretion
relative to acceptance if there is no prejudice." 97 Relying on insur-
92. Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 874 (NJ. 1968)
(footnote omitted); see also Peskin v. Liberty Mut, Ins. Co., 530 A.2d 822, 823 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that an eleven-year delay in providing notice of
an occurrence did not constitute prejudice to the insurance company as a matter of
law).
93. No. 86-6432, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. July 21, 1987) (footnote omitted), vacated
pursuant to stipulation between parties, 829 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 3.
95. See, eg., Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 482 (1994) (limiting forfeiture to circum-
stances when the insurance company can establish non-cooperation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, § 112 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (regulating
the liability of the insurance company under a motor vehicle liability policy).
96. Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 482 (1994); see Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Rosenbaum,
351 A.2d 197, 202-03 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
97. Aetna Technical Claim Manual B-5-1 (Oct. 1977).
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ance companies to "do the right thing," however, puts the policy-
holder at the mercy of a rule of men and not a rule of law.
In sum, placing the burden on the insurance company to prove prej-
udice is obviously more favorable to the policyholder than requiring
the policyholder to prove an absence of prejudice.98 Furthermore,
both of these rules are preferable to an automatic imposition of forfei-
ture.99 The differences, however, are still merely ones of degree. For-
feiture remains a possibility under any of the three approaches. Once
prejudice to the insurance company has been established, either by
way of the insurance company's proof, or the policyholder's failure of
proof, insurance benefits are denied entirely, even when the prejudice
suffered by the insurance company is minimal in relation to the harm
that forfeiture will inflict upon the policyholder. In other words, the
principal unfairness inherent in a prejudice analysis is that it continues
to permit forfeitures that are disproportionately harsh in comparison
to the damage suffered by the insurance company from the policy-
holder's noncompliance. The prejudice approach is like a slide rule in
a world filled with pocket calculators. The results of the analysis are
approximated, and include an unnecessary level of error, at least when
compared with the results achievable through use of an available,
more accurate, and efficient tool. 100
B. Proof of Loss
The notion that insurance companies need special assistance with
respect to claims investigation is specious. Insurance companies tout
their special expertise in claims handling and loss investigation.
Nearly every insurance company has a special unit to ferret out false
claims and the insurance industry has a plethora of industry-wide or-
ganizations to combat insurance fraud.' 0'
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
100. The measuring tool that the authors propose is the ordinary measure of re-
coupment or damages used in breach of contract cases. See infra part IV.
101. The insurance industry is well aware of the "problem" of fraud and takes steps
to educate itself and its counsel about the issue. See Defense Research Institute, In-
surance Fraud and Suspicious Claims Seminar (No. 9519) (Oct. 1995). At that two-
day seminar, over 15 attorneys who represent insurance companies discussed topics
such as "Fraud Indicators-What to Look For-Red Flags."
Many groups and special units have been charged with the task of fighting insur-
ance fraud. For example, a coalition of insurance companies, government agencies,
and consumer groups was formed in 1993 to advocate federal and state anti-fraud
legislation and regulation. Paul Dykewicz, New Coalition Urges Rules to Combat In-
surance Fraud, J. Com., June 4, 1993, at 8A. And, in 1992, the National Insurance
Crime Bureau was formed to fight workers' compensation fraud. George Griffith,
NICB Working with Insurers to Fight WC Fraud, Nat'l Underwriter, Apr. 19, 1993, at
12. In fact, insurance companies have even turned to private investigators to ferret-
out fraud. One owner of a chain of detective agencies in Lexington, Kentucky re-
ported that "[o]ur biggest percentage of business is workers compensation and insur-
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Nonetheless, failure to submit a timely and proper proof of loss may
result in forfeiture of insurance coverage. In Scott v. Exchange Mutual
Insurance Co.,"°2 an illiterate policyholder promptly provided her in-
surance company with notice of fire damage to personal property, and
the insurance company's adjuster visited the fire scene within four
days of the fire. An attorney representing the policyholder lost the
proof of loss form and requested another.'" The policyholder
changed her attorney thereafter, and the proof of loss form was not
submitted until 180 days after the fire."° The court held that the poli-
cyholder's insurance for personal property loss was entirely forfeited
because the proof of loss form was not submitted within sixty days as
required by the terms of the policy.105
Similarly, in Whitehead v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,106 the
policyholder, a store owner, sent notice of a burglary to his insurance
company the day after the burglary.107 The notice included a detailed
schedule of merchandise stolen, prepared by the policyholder's ac-
countant, with a listed value of $19,180.30.108 The policyholder did
not file a sworn proof of loss form within the sixty days required by
the policy or at any time before suit was filedY°9 The policyholder did,
however, permit the insurance company to review his books, and he
submitted a sworn affidavit about the facts of the case to the court.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance com-
pany because the policyholder failed to submit a sworn proof of
loss.110 The court's decision was rendered less than eight months after
the burglary. Thus, even though the policyholder was prepared to
submit to a sworn examination in court about very recent events, and
had provided an inventory and access to his records, the court ordered
his insurance forfeited for failure to submit the precise piece of paper
described in the policy within the prescribed period of time."'
In Aryeh v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co.," 2 the policyholder sub-
mitted an unsworn statement of her loss, but failed to submit a sworn
proof of loss within sixty days of the insurance company's request, as
ance fraud." Philip Campbell, Insurance Companies Turn to Detectives for Answers, J.
Com., May 4, 1994, at 11A.
102. No. 86-45-11, 1986 WL 6276 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 1986).
103. 1& at *2.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *10.
106. 543 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Ga. 1982), affd, 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983).
107. Id. at 968.
108. I&
109. Id. at 970.
110. Id at 970-71.
111. After the expiration of the 60-day period, the insurance company first sug-
gested to the policyholder that he submit a proof-of-loss form. Id at 970. The court
noted that "[flor reasons that are not apparent from the record, [the policyholder]
chose not to do so." Id.
112. 525 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (App. Div. 1988).
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required by the policy. As a result, the court found that there was no
insurance coverage for a burglary loss. 113
As with the notice requirement, however, some states will not auto-
matically impose forfeiture for failure to submit a proper proof of
loss." 4 In those states, coverage will be lost only if the insurance com-
pany can prove that it was prejudiced by the policyholder's failure to
submit a timely proof of loss." 5
C. Examination Under Oath
Noncompliance with a condition requiring examination under oath
can also result in forfeiture. In a recent case, Goldman v. State Farm
Fire General Insurance Co.,116 a court determined that the failure to
submit to an examination under oath was a willful and material breach
of the insurance policy which precluded recovery." 7 The court char-
acterized the condition requiring examination under oath as a condi-
tion precedent,"18 and held that there was no requirement that the
insurance company show prejudice. 1 9 The court imposed forfeiture
despite the fact that an examination under oath, in the form of a depo-
sition, was available to an insurance company during coverage litiga-
tion. Forfeiture was nevertheless imposed when the policyholder had
refused to submit to the examination under oath before litigation.
In addition to the failure to submit to an examination under oath,
the failure to answer specific questions and to turn over financial and
other documents requested by the insurance company has also re-
sulted in loss of insurance coverage. In Powell v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co.,120 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-44-50 (1994) (allowing the jury to decide the
question of forfeiture under some circumstances); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 631.81 (West
1995) (allowing a policyholder to file a claim within one year after the time required
by the policy).
115. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-44-50 (1994) (requiring the insurance company to show
prejudice); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 631.81 (West 1995) (same).
116. 660 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
117. Id at 303 (citing Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Putnal, 49 So. 922, 932 (Fla. 1909);
Stringer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also
Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944 (11th Cir.) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege does not excuse the policyholder from submitting to a
sworn examination before filing an action to recover insurance policy proceeds), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990); Watson v. National Sur. Corp., 468 N.W.2d 448, 451
(Iowa 1991) (holding that submission to an examination under oath was a condition
precedent to recovery under the insurance policy); Fineberg v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 438 S.E.2d 754, 755 (N.C. Ct. App.) (declining to create a good cause
exception to the requirement that the policyholder submit to an examination under
oath).
118. Goldman, 660 So. 2d at 303.
119. Id. at 303-04 (citing Bolivar County Bd. of Supervisors v. Forum Ins. Co., 779
F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1986) and DeFerrari v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 613 So.
2d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
120. 88 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Circuit held that a homeowners' insurance company was not obligated
to pay the fire loss claim of its policyholders when the policyholders
refused to answer some questions and refused to turn over certain
financial records in connection with an examination under oath. The
policyholders had argued that the examination-under-oath clause was
limited in scope, but the court, after examining the law in other juris-
dictions, 121 disagreed and held that the examination-under-oath clause
was broad enough to cover financial information, including tax returns
and income-source information.
D. Misrepresentations in Applications
The gulf between the dramatic harm suffered by the policyholder
from forfeiture and the harm to the insurance company from the poli-
cyholder's noncompliance is perhaps widest in cases when misrepre-
sentation in connection with the purchase of insurance is asserted as a
defense to payment. Although states generally require that life and
disability insurance policies contain incontestability clauses,-' most
other policyholders cannot rely on such clauses.
Incontestability clauses have long been recognized as a means to
protect the public against untimely denials of insurance coverage. By
the early twentieth century, states had passed statutes mandating that
certain insurance policies be incontestable. 123 Despite this develop-
ment, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a statute
that precluded an insurance company's defense based on a pre-ex-
isting disability' 24 did not preclude an insurance company from deny-
ing a claim when the policyholder intentionally concealed a disabling
disease in the insurance application."- 5
121. Id. at 273 (citing Pisa v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 787 F. Supp. 283,
285-86 (D.R.I.), affd, 966 F.2d 1440 (1st Cir. 1992); Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co., 290 F. Supp. 141, 145-48 (W.D. Wis. 1968), affd, 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969)).
122. Incontestability clauses in life insurance policies protect a policyholder from a
contest as to the validity of the policy. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §§ 761, 762 (1982 &
Supp. 1996). Ordinarily the clause provides that the policy shall be incontestable after
the period designated (usually one or two years) except for certain noted reasons. Id.
Similarly, incontestability clauses are required in disability policies. See, eg.,
Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 770,775 (D. Del. 1995) (quoting Del.
Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3306 (a)(2) (1989)).
123. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1102 (NJ. 1994) (citing 7
Williston on Contracts § 912, at 395 (3d ed. 1963)); see Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
As one commentator has stated, incontestability clauses exist because of wide-
spread "charges of corruption, fraud and dishonesty" in the insurance industry. Id. at
1109 (O'Hearn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Eric K.
Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 267,269 (1990)).
124. For example, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 17B:26-5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996) requires an
incontestability provision in all health insurance policies.
125. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 644 A.2d at 1108-09; see Ledley v. William Penn Life
Ins. Co., 651 A.2d 92, 99 (NJ. 1995); see also Fioretti v. Massachusetts Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 53 F3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying New Jersey law).
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Claims often arise, of course, before the date of incontestability, or
under policies that do not contain an incontestability clause. In such
cases courts have frequently held that actual reliance upon, or preju-
dice to, the insurance company is unnecessary to permit avoidance of
the policy by the insurance company, as long as the statement is mate-
rial to the risk. 126 In some jurisdictions, proof of a fraudulent mis-
statement by the policyholder will be sufficient to avoid coverage even
when the misstatement was not material.12 7
The rules about misrepresentation achieve perhaps their highest
level of abstraction (indeed, absurdity) in the principle that a material
misrepresentation will defeat coverage even when the fact misrepre-
sented was entirely unrelated to the risk from which the loss ulti-
mately resulted. Thus, for example, a court has held that a failure to
disclose a poor driving record justified a denial of coverage notwith-
standing that the policyholder was not driving when the accident hap-
pened.' 28 A court has also held that a misstatement about prior
insurance coverage was sufficient to defeat a recovery on a claim for
theft of a trailer.129 A misrepresentation by an applicant about his
health history was the basis for a denial of life insurance coverage
even when the policyholder died from a cause unrelated to the condi-
tion misrepresented. 30 As illogical as it is, the notion that an insur-
ance company may disclaim coverage on the basis of
misrepresentation, even in the absence of a causal link between the
misrepresentation and the loss, is probably the majority view.13 1
126. See, e.g., Perry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 734 F.2d 1441, 1443 (11th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a material misrepresentation will void an insurance policy
even when the insurance company neither relied on the misrepresentation nor suf-
fered any prejudice).
127. See, e.g., Upton v. Western Life Ins. Co., 492 F.2d 148, 149 (6th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a showing of materiality is uneccesary when a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion is made). Under general contract and tort law, of course, a misrepresentation
must be material before the law will afford relief. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34,
§ 9-14, at 357. Only under insurance law, in some states, is misrepresentation pun-
ished purely on moral grounds without regard to its effect upon the complaining
party.
In an even more sweeping argument, at least one insurance company has asserted
that misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact that were not made in con-
nection with the insurance application should entitle the insurance company to re-
scind the policy. Reply Brief to Plaintiffs Opposition to Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Bad
Faith at 70-82, Biddie Sawyer Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. MON-L-5219-91
(NJ. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
128. Countryside Casualty Co. v. Orr, 523 F.2d 870, 872-74 (8th Cir. 1975).
129. Bagwell v. Canal Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 710, 711-712 (6th Cir. 1981).
130. Montgomery v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1979).
131. See Wickersham v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 456, 460
(Mich. 1982).
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1II. FoRurruRE Is AN IMPROPER AND UNDULY HARSH REMEDY
Courts have improperly imposed forfeitures on policyholders for
minor and technical violations of an insurance policy. This part argues
that forfeiture is an improper remedy, given three important consider-
ations: (1) a policyholder's lack of notice that forfeiture will result
from a minor breach of the insurance contract; (2) the arguments of
insurance companies themselves against forfeitures asserted in their
disputes with reinsurers; and (3) general principles of contract law that
disfavor forfeiture.
A. Lack of Notice to Policyholders
Standardized insurance policies do not inform the policyholder that
failure to comply with the enumerated conditions will result in forfei-
ture of coverage. For example, in a standard form liability insurance
policy (a commercial general liability or "CGL" policy), the Insuring
Agreement recites that the insurance company will pay those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay "as damages," and
contains a long list of exclusions to coverage." The policy explains in
detail who the persons insured will be, and sets forth the limits of
insurance. Section IV, the "Commercial General Liability Condi-
tions," however, is a different animal. Condition Two, "Duties in the
Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit," informs the policyholder that it
must provide notice of an occurrence or of a suit brought against it "as
soon as practicable."' 33 It does not say, "if you do not, coverage will
be forfeited."'" Commentators have agreed that insurance policies
are "inferior sources of information.' 35
The threat of forfeiture is likewise conspicuously absent from the
relevant portion of the standard 165-line fire insurance policy. 13 That
standard policy, at lines 28-37, begins (in boldface print) with "Condi-
tions Suspending or Restricting Insurance," and provides, for exam-
ple, that the insurance company "shall not be liable for loss occurring"
while the property is vacant.' 37 But later in the policy, at lines 97-122,
the conditions requiring that the policyholder submit to an examina-
132. 1 Miller & Lefebvre, supra note 41, at 409-12.
133. Id at 415.
134. Interpreting a notice provision to require forfeiture in the case of noncompli-
ance violates the familiar precept that ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be
construed in favor of the policyholder. See Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 821
S.W.2d 798, 802 (Ky. 1991) (holding that without contractual language "clearly spell-
ing out the meaning and parameters of prompt notice and automatic forfeiture conse-
quences, the reach of the term and the consequences are vague. The policy has a
latent ambiguity which is subject to the rule of construction that applies to a contract
of adherence").
135. Young, supra note 83, at 4 (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk 32,
79-82 (1986), and Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 6.3(4) (1988)).
136. 1 Miller & Lefebvre, supra note 41, at 456.
137. Id
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tion under oath are not introduced with a similar boldfaced state-
ment.138 The policyholder would not reasonably expect,'139 in reading
the policy, that non-compliance with the proof of loss condition or the
examination under oath condition would result in a loss or restriction
of insurance coverage.
The historical development of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy
supports the argument that forfeiture should not be read into the pol-
icy language. The 1886 New York Standard Fire Insurance policy con-
tained thirteen express conditions. 140 A breach of any of the
conditions voided the insurance coverage, whether or not the breach
caused the loss to the insurance company. There was a great deal of
litigation concerning these conditions which "was a good measure of
the public's dissatisfaction with the form.'' In response, a number
of states adopted a new form, the 1918 New York Standard Form, in
which only a violation of the first five conditions, involving ownership
of the building, voided the policy.' 42 Later, the 1943 standard policy
eliminated all but two-the vacancy clause and the increase-of-hazard
clause.' 43 Despite this history, forfeiture persists as a remedy for fail-
ure to comply with the proof of loss provision, or the examination
under oath requirement.' 44 Considering the long historical develop-
ment of the standard fire insurance policy and the gradual elimination
of express conditions, forfeiture for noncompliance with two implied
conditions, the examination under oath or the proof of loss provisions,
makes little sense. 45
138. Id at 456.1.
139. The reasonable expectations doctrine has been applied in a majority of juris-
dictions, totalling 33 states. Ostrager & Newman, supra note 10, § 1.03 [b][2], at 21-24
(noting that California, New Jersey, and New York are among the jurisdictions that
follow this doctrine). The doctrine, advanced most prominently by Professor Robert
Keeton, holds that policy language will be construed in accordance with the objec-
tively reasonable expectations of the policyholder. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970).
140. Herbert C. Brook, Recent Contract Developments and Their Implication for
Future Litigation, Ins. L.J., Jan. 1954, at 170, 171.
141. Id. at 171.
142. I&
143. Id. at 172.
144. See Whitehead v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 543 F. Supp. 967, 969-70
(N.D. Ga. 1982), affd, 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983); Aryeh v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co., 525 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (App. Div. 1988); Scott v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., No. 86-
45-I1, 1986 WL 6276, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 1986).
145. Insurance companies' arguments that insurance coverage should be forfeited
are similar to what is known as "post-loss" underwriting. This is a practice by some
insurance companies by which, following a loss or damage, they argue that they did
not provide coverage for the loss. For an excellent fictional account of post-loss un-
derwriting, see John Grisham, The Rainmaker (1995). For a compilation of articles
concerning this novel, see Law and Literature: A Collection of Essays on John
Grisham's The Rainmaker, 26 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1251 (1996).
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B. Insurance Companies Are Opposed to Forfeiture
Although the insurance industry is quick to demand that courts im-
pose draconian forfeitures on policyholders,'4 insurance companies
who are involved in insurance coverage disputes with reinsurers rou-
tinely assert that their breach of a policy condition is merely a "techni-
cal breach" of the insurance policy. These arguments by insurance
companies are perhaps the best evidence of the absurdity of total for-
feiture of insurance coverage for noncompliance with insurance policy
provisions. The insurance industry does not play by the rules that it
promulgates and attempts to enforce against policyholders. In es-
sence, what is good for the insurance company goose is not good for
the policyholder gander. 47
There are a number of instances that illustrate the insurance indus-
try's duplicity. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, in argu-
ing that its reinsurance company could not deny insurance coverage
based upon late notice, asserted that "[aln insurance policy is not to
be construed as a game of cat and mouse, in which the insurer.., can
avoid liability if he succeeds in catching his insured in a technical
breach."' Moreover, two Hartford Insurance Group members, New
146. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,
822 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1987); Steelcase, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., No.
G87-553 CA1, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 1989), affd, 907 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990);
Halstead Oil Co. v. Northern Ins. Co., 579 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (App. Div. 1991).
147. This, however, is not unusual. Insurance companies spend a great deal of
money and time battling policyholders. Insurance companies "spend (conservatively)
a billion dollars a year in so-called 'coverage litigation."' Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Insurance Association at 3, Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins.
Corp., 626 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06165); see also Brief and Appendix of
Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Association ("IELA"), in Sup-
port of Continental Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company and
Firemen's Insurance Company of Newark, NJ, at 25 n.21, County of Columbia, N.Y.
v. Continental Ins. Co., 634 N.E2d 946 (N.Y. 1994) (No. 65599) (stating that "insur-
ance companies have filed tens of thousands of briefs across the country in a number
of courts and in a vast variety of contexts"). There are no lobbyists, trade organiza-
tions, and precious few special interest groups representing insurance policyholders in
the United States. In contrast, there are scores of insurance trade organizations rep-
resenting hundreds of insurance companies. See State of Washington Office of Insur-
ance Commissioner, Comments on Insurance Commissioner Matter R 94-30:
Proposed Rule Making Regarding Environmental Claims Regulation (MarJApr.
1995) (illustrating the practices of various insurance companies and insurance indus-
try organizations). Some of these organizations include the Insurance Environmental
Litigation Association, Defense Research Institute, Pollution Liability Insurance As-
sociation, National Association of Independent Insurers, Alliance of American Insur-
ers, Association of California Insurance Companies, and the Georgia Association of
Property & Casualty Insurance Companies. For a discussion of the insurance indus-
try's strategy in claims handling from the viewpoint of counsel for policyholders, see
Eugene R. Anderson et al., Insurance Nullification by Litigation, Risk Mgmt., Apr.
1994, at 46.
148. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. at 41, Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Calvert Ins. Co., 826 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-
5898).
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England Reinsurance Company and First State Insurance Company,
characterized the forfeiture rule as a triumph of form over substance
arrived at through a "17th Century type of analysis."' 49 In attacking
the forfeiture rule, these insurance companies recognized "the need to
protect an insured from the severe consequences of a forfeiture of a
rightful payment, based on technical grounds .... "I" The insurance
companies characterized California law as having "recognized [that]
the public, i.e. the ultimate beneficiary of malpractice insurance, will
be deprived of any possibility of recovering damages if insurance is
declared forfeit."'151
Similarly, National Casualty Company, a member of the Nation-
wide Group, argued that "[a]n insurer may avoid coverage for late
notice where the notice has been so late as to prejudice the insurer.
The burden to avoid coverage is extremely heavy, as the law abhors
forfeitures in this situation.' 15 Great American Insurance Company,
a member of the American Financial Insurance Group, echoed that
position:
Where the insurance company's interests have not been harmed by
a late notice, even in the absence of extenuating circumstances to
excuse the tardiness, the reason behind the notice condition in the
policy is lacking, and it follows neither logic nor fairness to relieve
the insurance company of its obligations under the policy in such a
situation.1 53
The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, a part of the
American International Group, argued in court that "[tlhe notice re-
quirement serves to protect insurers from prejudice, but is not in-
tended to shield them from their contractual obligations. 154
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company continued, stating that "a majority ofjurisdictions have held that a technical breach of a notice provision in an insurance or
reinsurance contract will not excuse the insurer from liability unless the insurer can
prove a likelihood of actual prejudice from the breach." Id. at 42.
149. Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, New Eng. Reins. Corp. v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-6432).
150. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, New Eng. Reins. Corp. v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-6432) (quoting National Semicon-
ductor Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D. Conn. 1982)).
151. Il at 6.
152. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, National Casualty Co. v. Great Southwest Fire
Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (No. 91SC562) (citing Emcasco Ins. Co.
v. Dover, 678 P.2d 1051 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)).
153. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 33, Christiania Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F.
Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 87 Civ. 8310 (PKL)) (quoting Brakeman v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1977)), aff'd in part, 979 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1992)).
154. Appellant's Opening Brief of Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania
at 17, Insurance Co. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
55639); see also Memorandum of the Travelers Insurance Company in Opposition to
INA's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Feld Car & Truck
Leasing Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Kan. 1981) (No. 76-179-C6) ("[T]he better rea-
soned line of authority holds that an insured's coverage is not forfeited by reason of
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[W]here there is no prejudice, the notice requirement should not
provide a technical escape-hatch by which to deny coverage. In the
absence of prejudice, regardless of the reasons for or the length of
the delayed notice, there is no reason to excuse the insurer from its
obligations under the certificate.'
5 5
Finally, when Liberty Life Insurance Company sought to obtain re-
insurance coverage from its reinsurers, but failed to notify its reinsur-
ers immediately of the lawsuit, it argued that reinsurers should not be
permitted to "renege on their contractual obligations."' 5 6 Liberty
noted that under applicable South Carolina law,' 7 an insurance com-
pany must show "substantial prejudice" in order to avoid paying the
policyholder's defense costs. 158 Liberty maintained that the reinsurers
were not prejudiced "since each denied coverage and refused to pro-
vide a defense."'
59
In sum, insurance companies argue that forfeiture is anachronistic
when they are the potential victims of forfeiture. This reveals that in-
surance companies who deny coverage and argue for forfeiture
against policyholders are motivated solely by financial considerations,
not the interests of equity. As the insurance industry has demon-
strated through its own contradictory arguments, 160 forfeiture is an
unnecessary result in insurance cases.
delayed notice unless the [insurance company] proves that the failure to give timely
notice resulted in prejudice to the insurer.").
155. Opening Brief for Appellant at 22, Insurance Co. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co.,
922 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-55639).
156. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 20, Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-2111).
157. Id. at 24 (citing Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 727,729-30
(S.C. 1971)). Liberty also made the same argument under North Carolina, Florida,
Minnesota, and Missouri law, other states in which the underlying complaints against
Liberty were filed. Id.
158. Id. (citing Whittington v. Ranger Ins. Co., 201 S.E.2d 620, 623 (S.C. 1973) and
Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729-30 (S.C. 1971)).
159. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-2111).
160. The insurance industry frequently argues inconsistent positions. One of the
areas in which the insurance industry has taken inconsistent litigation positions in-
volves litigation concerning the meaning of the "polluters" exclusion. See Eugene R.
Anderson et al., Environmental Insurance Coverage in New Jersey: A Tale of Two
Stories, 24 Rutgers LJ. 83, 106-14 (1992) (cited with approval in Northern States
Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 660 n.5 (Minn. 1994)).
Courts, however, have consistently condemned the practice of asserting inconsis-
tent positions. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a
certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that posi-
tion, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, as-
sume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who
has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.
Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895).
The Michigan Supreme Court has expressed the rationale for this rule in the follow-
ing manner:
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C. Forfeiture Is a Disfavored Remedy in Contract Law
If a contract has been breached, the non-breaching party is entitled
to a remedy if that party has been damaged.161 The remedies gener-
ally applied in breach of contract cases are damages, restitution, coer-
cive remedies such as injunctions, and declaratory relief.162
Treatises on remedies or contracts do not identify forfeiture as a
remedy for breach of contract. 63 Forfeitures of contractual rights
have long been disfavored by courts and legislatures. A frequently
repeated aphorism is that "forfeitures are not favored in the law."'16
The courts of equity created the rule against arbitrary forfeiture of
contractual rights in the seventeenth century. 65 As one court de-
scribed the equity approach more recently, "[c]ourts of equity frown
upon the principle of forfeiture. As the keeper of the conscience of
If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the trial
of their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases be
paralyzed; the coercive process of the law, available only between those who
consented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the rights of all
men, honest and dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts, and consistency
of proceeding is therefore required of all those who come or are brought
before them.
Mertz v. Mertz, 18 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Mich. 1945) (quoting Bigelow on Estoppel 783
(6th ed. 1872)).
Courts have adopted several doctrines and rules to preclude litigants from asserting
inconsistent positions. These include: (1) judicial estoppel, which is also known as the
doctrine of "preclusion" against inconsistent positions, 18 Charles A. Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4477 (1981 ed. & Supp. 1992); (2) equitable estop-
pel, which bars a party from asserting an inconsistent position when another person
has relied upon the prior position, Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599
(6th Cir. 1982); (3) quasi-estoppel, which is also known as "estoppel by acceptance of
the benefits," 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §§ 107, 109 (1964 & Supp. 1996); (4) collateral estop-
pel, which precludes relitigation of an issue of fact or law which a court or administra-
tive agency has determined by a final judgment and which a party previously has
litigated or had an opportunity to litigate, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27
(1980); (5) judicial admissions, which recognizes that a litigant's judicial admission is
binding upon the speaker and may not be contradicted in a later proceeding, Davis v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987); (6) "mend the hold"
doctrine which "forbids a party to a contract to take inconsistent litigating positions
concerning the contract's meaning," AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs.,
44 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 1995); and (7) various evidentiary rules under which a liti-
gant's prior inconsistent statement is admissible as "not hearsay," see, e.g., Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2) (exception to hearsay rule); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1220, 1222 (same).
161. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, § 14-2, at 588.
162. See Dobbs, supra note 4, ch. 12; Farnsworth, supra note 4, ch. 12.
163. See, e.g., 5A Corbin on Contracts (West 1964) (excluding forfeiture in its dis-
cussion of alternative remedies for breach of contract).
164. See Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U.S. 234, 242 (1877); Ross v. State Life Ins.
Co., 143 So. 827, 828 (Ala. 1932); Johnson v. Life Ins. Co., 52 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla.
1951); Russell v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 116 A. 554, 556 (Me. 1922); Ley v. Home
Ins. Co., 251 N.W. 137, 141 (N.D. 1933); Von Uhl v. Trempealeau County Mut. Ins.
Co., 146 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Wis. 1966).
Even insurance law treatises repeat this statement. See, e.g., George J. Couch,
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 3d § 22:35 (1995) (citing over 30 cases).
165. See Loyd, supra note 5, at 125-26.
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the king, equity will ameliorate the harshness of the full application of
legal forfeitures, when, in a given case, justice demands such ac-
tion."'16 6 The law courts borrowed the rules against forfeiture after
their development in equity,167 and those rules are now widely applied
in a variety of contract cases.' 6
The disfavor in which forfeiture is held by the courts is consistent
with the courts' general disfavor of unduly harsh liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages provisions are lawful, but courts have been cau-
tious about enforcing such clauses. 169 Generally, if the court believes
the provision is a penalty, it will not be enforced. 170 This rule, which
arose in equity to prevent over-reaching and to give relief from uncon-
scionable bargains, was later adopted by the law courts.'
IV. REFORM PROPOSAL
This part discusses the various manners in which courts have sought
to reduce the likelihood of forfeiture resulting from minor breaches of
an insurance policy. This part argues, however, that such measures
are inadequate and proposes that, under the doctrine of substantial
performance, an insurance company's remedy should be limited to the
166. Rockaway Park Series Corp. v. Hollis Automotive Corp., 206 Misc. 955, 957
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
167. Loyd, supra note 5, at 126.
168. Note, though, that forfeiture may be a remedy prescribed by statute for a vio-
lation of a statute. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1963 (1994) (prescribing forfeiture when the RICO stat-
ute is violated). Because this Article discusses forfeiture as it relates to insurance,
forfeiture prescribed by statute is not discussed here. However, it should be noted
that courts are hesitant to impose forfeiture even in those cases. See, eg., United
States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996) (overturning verdict that or-
dered forfeiture of defendant's interest in property). It seems anomalous, to say the
least, that drug traffickers get more protection from the courts in forfeiture cases than
do insurance policyholders. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. CL 994, 1000-01 (1996)
(holding that forfeiture order concerning automobile, jointly owned by husband and
wife, as a result of husband's activity did not offend the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
169. Dobbs, supra note 5, § 12.1. For example, one of the parties may deposit some
form of security as a guarantee of performance, with the agreement that in the event
of a breach, the non-breaching party will keep the security. This arrangement is often
found in lease agreements, when a deposit of money secures against damage to the
property or non-payment of rent. Or, a bank may require a borrower to execute a
mortgage of property as security for a debt. If the debtor defaults, the bank seizes the
property. Bank seizures, however, have been severely restricted by courts and
legislatures.
Procedures to be followed in the event of default can likewise be specified in ad-
vance. The parties may agree to authorize a court to order specific performance in
the event of breach, or may stipulate that disputes will be arbitrated.
Parties to a contract have only limited power to bargain over their rights to a rem-
edy, however, and limitations are imposed by statute, public policy, and the doctrine
of unconscionability. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, § 12-18 n.1, at 895.
170. Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 146 (1935).
171. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, § 14-31, at 639.
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actual harm it has suffered from a policyholder's noncompliance with
a condition.
A. Current Methods of Avoiding Forfeiture
Insurance law has not been entirely oblivious to contract law's an-
tipathy for penalties. Courts have commonly avoided forfeiture of in-
surance by construing the neglected policy provision as a promised
performance, rather than as a "condition."' 72 Corbin describes the
technique as follows:
If a contract contains a provision providing for some performance
that does not constitute any substantial part of the subject-matter of
exchange by the parties, the courts much prefer the interpretation
that this provision is a promise to render the performance, rather
than that it makes the performance a condition precedent to the
defendant's duty. By the former interpretation, the failure to
render the performance merely creates a right to damages for such
injury as may be caused thereby: while by the latter interpretation,
the failure to render the performance would privilege the defendant
to refuse to render his part of the agreed exchange. Express provi-
sions in a contract, therefore, providing for an arbitration and award
under certain circumstances, or for the certificate of an architect or
engineer, or for the giving of a notice, or for the making of proof of
loss, will be held to be merely promissory in nature, and not to cre-
ate a condition precedent to the defendant's duty of performing un-
less the express words of the contract very clearly show a different
intention. 73
This technique of contractual interpretation may be applied to insur-
ance policies.
Alternatively, because the general American rule is to construe in-
surance policies in favor of the policyholder where possible,174 courts
avoid forfeitures by construing the language in favor of the
policyholder:
It has become a settled rule in the construction of contracts of insur-
ance that policies of insurance will be liberally construed to uphold
the contract and conditions contained in them which create forfeit-
ures will be construed most strongly against the insurer and will
never be extended beyond the strict words of the policy.175
Therefore, any ambiguity in the insurance contract should be in-
tepreted in favor of the policyholder.
172. In the insurance context, for example, see Elberton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. In-
demnity Ins. Co., 145 A. 33, 35 (Conn. 1929) (holding that the insurance policy does
not make the filing of the claim a condition precedent to the insurance company's
liability).
173. 3A Corbin on Contracts § 748 (West 1960 & Supp. 1996).
174. See supra note 134.
175. Baylor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 174 A. 526, 529 (NJ. 1934) (quoting
Carson v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 43 N.J.L. 300, 304 (1881)).
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Rules of waiver may also be used to avoid forfeiture of insurance
coverage. A common insurance law principle states that "[florfeitures
are not favored if there are any circumstances indicating a waiver
thereof."'17 6 Courts have deemed that insurance companies have
waived objections to the policyholder's failure to file a proof of loss, 77
failure to give notice of vacated premises in connection with a policy
requiring such notice," 8 and failure to comply with various other con-
ditions when the insurance company admitted liability. 79 Moreover,
when an insurance company has repudiated the policy and denied all
liability, it has waived the right to insist upon compliance with any
clause inserted for its benefit. °
Rules of construction and waiver can be useful palliatives but they
are, ultimately, inadequate solutions to the problem of forfeiture. If a
court can be persuaded by the insurance company that the language in
question is "unambiguous" or that no waiver occurred, forfeiture may
be the unfortunate result.
A few courts have denied the imposition of forfeitures on the basis
of unconscionability. One frequently-cited formulation of the doc-
trine is that "unconscionability... requires some showing of 'an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party."' 1s3 Unconscionability is both a common law'8 and a statu-
tory 83 doctrine.
Unconscionability is plainly a readily-available technique for avoid-
ing the punitive effects of insurance coverage forfeiture. Because the
unconscionability doctrine is a rule of decision rather than a rule of
construction,' 84 the courts may require insurance companies to
honor those policies for which premiums have been paid, notwith-
176. 16B Appleman & Appleman, supra note 27, § 9082, at 506-07.
177. See Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 374 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd in pant vacated in part, 508 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Continental
Life & Accident Co., 461 P.2d 243, 249 (Idaho 1969).
178. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New Albany, 146 So. 2d 351, 353 (Miss.
1962); Cashen v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1961).
179. See English & Am. Ins. Co. v. Swain Groves, Inc., 218 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla.
Dist. CL App. 1969) (co-insurance clause); Korch ex rel Doody v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
67 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946) (forwarding of summons).
180. See Grant v. Sun Indem. Co., 80 P.2d 996, 997 (Cal. 1938).
181. Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 617 (App.
Div. 1983) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965)).
182. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
183. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). Courts have held that contracts of insurance fall within
the unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. See C&J Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 181 (Iowa 1975); Yankelevitz v. Royal
Globe Ins. Co., 435 N.Y.S.2d 900, 907 (Sup. Ct. 1981), revd on other grounds, 451
N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (App. Div. 1982); Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1093-94
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
184. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, § 9-38, at 402.
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standing a technical breach of a policy clause or the fine print in the
insurance policy that has been drafted for the insurance company.
For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa used the doctrine of un-
conscionability to avoid forfeiture of insurance in C&J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.185 In that case, the insurance policy
provided coverage for burglary, but limited the coverage for burglary
to those cases in which there were "visible marks made by tools ... or
physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of...
entry"'186 The policyholder was able to show that an unknown third
person had committed a burglary on its premises,8 7 but was unable to
produce the specific evidence of forced entry required by the policy.
The court concluded that enforcement of this restrictive definition of
burglary was unconscionable in a policy intended to protect against
burglary.'88 The court refused enforcement of the clause and granted
recovery to the policyholder.
In sum, the unconscionability doctrine dictates a fair and correct
result by ignoring the fiction that an unnegotiated and technical clause
ultimately breached was part of the parties' "agreement." When the
policyholder has paid all premiums due, and insurance is denied after
a loss for an inconsequential noncompliance with a non-negotiated,
boilerplate provision in the insurance policy, the requirements for in-
vocation of the doctrine of unconscionability are squarely met.
Unconscionability, however, is a blunt instrument. It is only rarely
invoked, and when it is, it is criticized as a threat to the finality and
enforceability of private contracts.8 9 The doctrine, although a princi-
pled response to the unfairness of forfeitures, is as imprecise as the
forfeiture rules it is invoked to counteract.
Other courts have avoided forfeiture of insurance coverage by re-
quiring only substantial performance of a policy condition. Substan-
tial performance of a condition is simply another way of describing an
immaterial breach, with the court focusing on the materiality of the
breach rather than on the materiality of the provision at issue.1 90 For
example, in one case, submission of a proof of loss form after the poli-
cyholder brought suit seeking insurance coverage was held to be sub-
stantial compliance with a provision requiring submission of a proof of
loss form within sixty days of the loss.' In another case, a policy-
holder's submission of documentation after an initial, interrupted
sworn examination was substantial performance of a sworn examina-
185. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
186. Id. at 171.
187. Id at 171-72. The policyholder successfully refuted the suggestion that the
burglary might have been an "inside job," the eventuality toward which the "visible
exterior marks" requirement was presumably directed. Id.
188. Id. at 181.
189. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, § 9-38, at 401.
190. See infra text accompanying note 195.
191. Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 347 N.W.2d 595, 598-600 (Wis. 1984).
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tion clause and could create a triable issue of fact concerning the in-
surance company's demand for forfeiture. 19
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it only protects
policyholders who make a reasonable "college try," or even those who
make grudging or reluctant efforts to comply, but fails to assist policy-
holders who are unaware of a given provision or unable, for whatever
reason, to fulfill it. Therefore, the operator of a safe plant who never
makes a claim and is unaware of the need to provide notice of an
occurrence is harshly penalized, although the unsafe operator, familiar
with insurance, is saved by half-hearted compliance wvith the policy
condition rather than full compliance. A more rational approach is
needed.
B. Recoupment or Damages Is the Proper Remedy
Any remedy imposes costs and creates benefits. In choosing among
remedies, courts usually choose a remedy that will "approximately
vindicate the plaintiff's right."' 93 In choosing forfeiture as a remedy
for non-compliance with an insurance policy condition, however,
courts are choosing a blunderbuss when a pistol is all that is needed.
This part argues that courts should find that the regular payment of
premiums constitutes substantial performance of the insurance con-
tract as a whole. Consequently, noncompliance with a policy condi-
tion should only result in recoupment or damages for the insurance
company.
1. Substantial Performance of the Insurance Contract
A policyholder's breach of a policy condition should result, at most,
in recoupment or damages to the insurance company. When a policy-
holder fails to fulfill a provision of the policy not involving the pay-
ment of premiums, the policyholder's recoverable loss can simply be
reduced by the amount of any damages that the insurance company
can show it suffered as a result of the failure. That result can be
achieved without the need for legislation, and in virtually any insur-
ance case by applying the contract law doctrine of "substantial per-
formance" to an insurance claim.'9 4
The doctrine of "substantial performance" permits recovery by a
party that has substantially performed its obligations under an agree-
ment but that has also breached the agreement:
192. High Fashions Hair Cutters v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.. 535 N.Y.S.2d 425,
426 (App. Div. 1988).
193. Dobbs, supra note 4, § 1.9, at 35.
194. The doctrine of substantial performance must be distinguished from the nar-
rower rule regarding "substantial performance" of a policy condition. See supra notes
190-92 and accompanying text. In the former case, the entire contract is substantially
performed; in the latter case, the focus is only on the performance of a single
condition.
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[W]hen a contract has been partially executed, and one of the par-
ties has derived substantial benefits ... through the [other's] partial
performance of the agreement, then the first party cannot rescind
the contract on account of the failure of the second party to com-
plete his performance... of it, and his only remedy for the failure of
the second party to completely perform is compensation in damages
for that breach.195
Substantial performance is frequently associated with construction liti-
gation. In that context, courts have traditionally recognized a need to
deal more equitably with the situation when a contractor has substan-
tially completed a construction contract, and conferred a benefit on
the owner of land, but has breached a term of the contract on which
payment was expressly conditioned. 196 The solution is to award the
contractor its contract price, less an offset sufficient to compensate the
owner for the partial breach.' 97 The Arkansas Supreme Court stated
the operation of the rule succinctly:
[A] contractor who has substantially performed is entitled to re-
cover the contract price, less the difference in value between the
work as done and [the work] contracted to be done, or less the cost
of correcting defective work where this can be done without great
expense or material injury to the structure as a whole.198
The court then added the following significant, and accurate, observa-
tion: "[The cited] cases involved the construction of a building. How-
ever, the doctrine of substantial performance is not restricted to
building contracts but applies to contracts of all kinds."'19 9 The sub-
stantial performance doctrine is as well suited for application to insur-
ance policies as it is to construction contracts. A policyholder who has
paid premiums to an insurance company should receive payment on
its claim for loss, despite a failure to comply with other provisions of
the policy. The policyholder's payment may be reduced by an amount
sufficient to compensate the insurance company for any damage it suf-
fers as a result of the policyholder's noncompliance with policy
provisions.
195. 6 Williston on Contracts § 843 (3d ed. 1962) (citing German Say. Inst. v. DeLa
Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co., 70 F. 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1895)).
196. 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1089 (West 1964).
197. The credit or affirmative recovery due the owner is the reasonable amount it
has cost, or will cost, the owner to finish the job, less any part of the contract price
remaining unpaid, plus damages for delay in securing the use of the building. Id.; see
McCormick, supra note 170, § 68. The owner has the burden of proving the cost of
completion or repair, and thus bears the burden of proof on the claim for recoup-
ment. See Hopkins Constr. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 475 P.2d 223, 224-25 (Alaska
1970).
198. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 685 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Ark. Ct. App.).
199. Iad
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In the insurance context, substantial performance is easily identi-
fied.' When the policyholder has made timely payment of all premi-
ums due, the contract has been substantially performed. As the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida
noted:
United Capitol [Insurance Company] ... has already received the
most material and substantial performance required under the Poli-
cies: the payment in full of over $1.4 million in premiums. At this
point, a material breach of the Policies by [policyholder] FIE...
absent bankruptcy, would not have relieved United Capitol of its
coverage obligations under the Policies ....
United Capitol is not remediless [sic] in this situation, however.
If [the policyholder] ... failed to fund the SIR [self-insured reten-
tion] ... United Capitol, assuming it has complied with the proper
procedures ... may be entitled to maintain a claim against [the poli-
cyholder] for those same damages. 01
In sum, draconian forfeitures can be eliminated by application of this
rule and the result- will be eminently fair to policyholders and insur-
ance companies alike.
2. The Proper Remedy Applied
Because many harms that might be suffered by an insurance com-
pany from a policyholder's noncompliance with a condition are quan-
tifiable, they can often be remedied by an award of recoupment, or by
an award of damages to the insurance company.2° For example, un-
necessary investigation costs incurred due to a policyholder's failure
to provide information in her files, or as a result of refusing to submit
a sworn proof of loss, can be calculated. If the policyholder fails to
provide timely notice of a claim resulting in a default judgment against
the policyholder, the insurance company should be compensated for
attorneys' fees expended to have the judgment reopened.
Lost settlement opportunities are another quantifiable harm result-
ing from a policyholder's noncompliance with a notice provision. If
the policyholder has rejected a third party's demand before notice to
the insurance company has been provided, the rejected demand can
be compared to the ultimate liability. If the insurance company can
200. The requisite level of performance necessary to sustain a substantial perform-
ance claim is unclear. See 3A Corbin on Contracts § 704 (West 1960). Thus, a builder
must render a minimum, somewhat il-defined level of performance before the sub-
stantial performance rule will be applied. See id. The key factor is whether the per-
forming party has conferred a substantial benefit on the other party-and that factor
should be satisfied where premiums have been timely paid.
201. In re Firearms Import & Export Corp., 131 B.R. 1009, 1014 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1991).
202. An affirmative award of actual damages, as opposed to recoupment, would be
most appropriate where the harm to the insurance company is quantifiable, but the
insurance company's performance is being rendered in kind.
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show that it would likely have accepted and paid the demand, its lia-
bility for the claim should be capped at the amount of the demand.
Additional investigation expenses caused by late notice are a com-
ponent of a recoupment or damages award in favor of the insurance
company. If the defense requires a lengthy face-to-face interview with
a witness who has moved to China, and the insurance company could
have held such an interview at the site of the event had notice been
given earlier, the additional cost of this interview might be considered
a result of the policyholder's noncompliance. The insurance company
should be entitled to recover that extra cost.
Admittedly, harm alleged by insurance companies due to late notice
of a claim can sometimes be difficult to quantify. The insurance com-
pany may argue that it cannot demonstrate the loss of favorable evi-
dence as a result of starting its investigation late, and should not bear
the burden of proving the unprovable. After all, it was the policy-
holder who caused a problem by providing late notice. Therefore the
policyholder should bear the risk of lost evidence.
All litigation, however, is affected by the passage of time, whether
or not it begins with timely notice. Witnesses die, move away, forget
what they saw, and change their stories. It will be a rare case indeed
when defeat could have been turned into triumph if only the insurance
company could have talked to a mystery witness within the notice pe-
riod. It is possible to imagine such a result, but speculation about its
occurrence should not dictate the results in countless cases of late
notice.
Application of a forfeiture rule based upon the notion that the in-
surance company "does not know what it does not know," e.g., that it
cannot specify the cost of an absence of early investigation, would
deny insurance because uncertainty exists. The purpose of insurance,
however, is to spread the risk of uncertainty. If the insurance com-
pany cannot quantify the harms from a breach of a condition, within
the broad limits of American rules on damages, then the uncertainty
should be reflected in the rate base, and not in a loss of insurance to a
single policyholder.
The notion that only those policyholders who "follow the rules" and
comply fully with policy conditions should be covered is, in itself, in-
consistent with the purpose of insurance. Insurance is normally avail-
able for negligent conduct, for wrongful acts, and very often for
intentional conduct.2 °3 If the insurance company cannot demonstrate
or quantify harm from a breach of a condition, then folding the effects
of the noncompliance into the rate base does no more violence to the
203. See Eugene R. Anderson et al., Employment Discrimination and Liability In-
surance. Even Insurance Companies Say You May Be Covered, Merrit Risk Mgmt.
Rev., Dec. 4, 1995, at 3.
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concept of insurance than does insuring negligent and intentional con-
duct in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Forfeiture is an unfair, draconian remedy that should no longer be
applied in insurance law, routinely or otherwise. A policyholder who
has paid premiums and purchased an insurance policy that is affected
with a public interest should be treated at least as favorably as a party
to any type of contract. In the world of insurance, forfeiture as a pun-
ishment does not fit the crime. Draconian forfeitures can be elimi-
nated by the simple application of traditional contractual remedies,
notably, the doctrine of substantial performance. When a policy-
holder has regularly paid premiums on his policy, courts should find
that the insurance policy has been substantially performed and that
the insurance company's recovery for noncompliance with a policy
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Louisiana law); Auster
Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Stream, 891 F.2d 570,
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Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Under an "occurrence"-
based liability policy, the
insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced. Under a "claims-
made" policy, forfeiture is the
result.
If timely notice by the
policyholder is a condition
precedent to recovery under
the policy, then failure to give
timely notice results in
forfeiture. If timely notice is
not a condition precedent,
then the insurance company
has the burden of showing
prejudice.




Bonding & Cas. Co.,
495 A.2d 1232, 1235
(Me. 1985).
Md. Code Ann., Ins.,
§ 482 (1957);
Harleysville Ins. Co. v.
Rosenbaum, 351 A.2d
197, 202 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1976).
Johnson Controls, Inc.
v. Bowes, 409 N.E2d
185, 187 (Mass. 1980);
see Mass. Gen. L. ch.
175, § 112 (1994).
Burgess v. American
Fidelity Fire Ins. Co.,
310 N.W.2d 23, 24-25
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981);
West Bay Exploration
Co. v. AIG Specialty
Agencies, 915 F.2d
1030, 1036 (6th Cir.
1990) (applying
Michigan law).
Reliance Ins. Co. v. St.




& Speakman, 869 F.2d
422, 424-25 (8th Cir.
1989) (applying
Minnesota law).
Bolivar County Bd. of
Supervisors v. Forum
Ins. Co., 779 F.2d 1081,






Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Forfeiture.
Court weighs three factors:
(1) length of delay; (2) reasons
for delay; (3) whether delay
resulted in prejudice to the
insurance company.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has the





Prejudice is one of the factors
to be considered in
determining the
reasonableness of the delay.
Insurance company has burden
of showing prejudice
substantially disabled it in its
defense.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Greer v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 32
(Mo. 1969).
J.G. Link & Co. v.
Continental Casualty
Co., 470 F.2d 1133,
1139 (9th Cir. 1972),
(applying Montana
law), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 829 (1973).
MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sailors, 141 N.W.2d
846, 849 (Neb. 1966).
State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli,





Sch. Dist., 428 A.2d
894, 896 (N.H. 1981).
Cooper v. Government
Employees Ins. Co.,
237 A.2d 870, 874 (N.J.
1968); see Morales v.
National Grange Mut.
Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 325,
327-28 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1980).
Foundation Reserve Ins.
Co. v. Esquibel, 607
P.2d 1150, 1152 (N.M.
1980).
Security Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Acker-Fitzsimons
Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76,
78 (N.Y. 1972);
Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Garsart Bldg. Corp.,
517 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190









DRACONIAN FORFEITURES OF INSURANCE
North Carolina Two-step test: (1) Did
policyholder act in good faith?
If no, then notice is untimely;
if yes, then: (2) insurance
company has the burden of
showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company is
presumed to have been
prejudiced. Policyholder may
rebut.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Two-step test: (1) Insurance
company must show that it
was prejudiced by untimely
notice; if it does, then: (2)
Did policyholder act
reasonably? If yes, then
insurance company must
defend even if it was
prejudiced.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
N.Y.2d 610 (1987); see
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v.
North River Ins. Co.,
594 N.E.2d 571, 571
(N.Y. 1992).
Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
C.G. Tate Constr. Co.,
279 S.E.2d 769, 774-75
(N.C. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 340
S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
Finstad v. Steiger
Tractor, Inc, 301
N.W.2d 392, 398 (N.D.
1981).
Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Valley Steel Erectors,
Inc., 233 N.E.2d 597,
599 (Ohio Ct. App.
1968) (citing Security
Ins. Co. v. Snyder-
Lynch Motors, Inc., 7
Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
Independent Sch. Dist.




Casualty & Sur. Co.,
538 P.2d 902, 905 (Or.
1975).
Brakeman v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193,
196 (Pa. 1977).
Cooley v. John M.
Anderson Co., 443
A.2d 435, 437 (R.I.
1982).
Squires v. National
Grange Mut. Ins. Co.,




















If policy is pre-1976, late
notice results in forfeiture. If
policy is post-1976, insurance
company must prove
prejudice.
Failure of policyholder to
comply with notice
requirement in insurance
policy which conforms to
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 31-
33-3) results in forfeiture.
Policyholder has the burden of
explaining or excusing delay in




Policyholders must make a
prima facie case that notice
was given to shift ultimate
burden of notice to issuer.
Insurance company has burden
of showing it has been
prejudiced.
Insurance company has the
burden of showing it has been
prejudiced.
(S.C. 1965); see Noisette
v. Ismail, 384 S.E.2d
310, 315 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 S.E.2d
122 (S.C. 1991).
Wolff v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Am., 472 N.W.2d
233, 236-37 (S.D. 1991).
Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Creasy,
530 S.W.2d 778, 781
(Tenn. 1975); see North
River Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 757 S.W.2d
334, 335 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1988).
Shelton v. Ray, 570
S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978).
Hunter v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d
805, 810 (10th Cir.
1971) (applying Utah
law).
Putney Sch. v. Schaaf,
599 A.2d 322, 327 (Vt.
1991); Stonewall Ins.
Co. v. Moorby, 298
A.2d 826, 829 (Vt.
1972).
Erie Ins. Exch. v.
Meeks, 288 S.E.2d 454,
456-57 (Va. 1982).
Castle & Cooke, Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 711
P.2d 1108, 1111 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986); Simms
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 621
P.2d 155, 157 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1980).
State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438
F. Supp. 227, 231-32
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Wisconsin
(S.D. W. Va. 1977)
(applying West Virginia
law).
Gerrard Realty Corp. v.
American States Ins.
Co., 277 N.W.2d 863,
872 (wis. 1979).
Under Wis. Stat. Ann. § 631.81
(West 1995), when notice is
given as soon as reasonably
possible and within one year
of the time notice is required
by the policy, the insurance
company is presumed to not
have been prejudiced; but the
insurance company may rebut
the presumption. Under case
law, when notice is given more
than one year after the time
required by the policy, the
insurance company is
presumed to have been
prejudiced; but policyholder
may rebut presumption.
No case law found.Wyoming

